This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.
| Autorius: | Moshe Dror, Shuo Zeng, |
| Serija: | SpringerBriefs in Operations Management |
| Leidėjas: | Springer Nature Switzerland |
| Išleidimo metai: | 2015 |
| Knygos puslapių skaičius: | 140 |
| ISBN-10: | 331918671X |
| ISBN-13: | 9783319186719 |
| Formatas: | 235 x 155 x 8 mm. Knyga minkštu viršeliu |
| Kalba: | Anglų |
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